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Abstract. Homograph attack is a way that attackers deceive victims about which website
domain name they are communicating with by exploiting the fact that many characters
look alike. The attack becomes serious and is raising broad attention when recently many
brand domains have been attacked such as Apple Inc., Adobe Inc., Lloyds Bank, etc. We
first design a survey of human demographics, brand familiarity, and security backgrounds
and apply it to 2,067 participants. We build a regression model to study which factors affect
participants’ ability in recognizing homograph domains. We find that for different levels
of visual similarity, the participants exhibit different abilities. 13.95% of participants can
recognize non-homographs while 16.60% of participants can recognize homographs whose
the visual similarity with the target brand domains is under 99.9%; but when the similarity
increases to 99.9%, the number of participants who can recognize homographs significantly
drops down to only 0.19%; and for the homographs with 100% of visual similarity, there
is no way for the participants to recognize. We also find that female participants tend to
recognize homographs better the male but male participants tend to able to recognize non-
homographs better than females. Security knowledge is a significant factor affecting both
homographs and non-homographs; surprisingly, people who have strong security knowledge
tend to be able to recognize homographs but not non-homographs. Furthermore, people
who work or are educated in computer science or computer engineering do not appear as a
factor affecting the ability in recognizing homographs; however, interestingly, right after they
are explained about the homograph attack, people who work or are educated in computer
science or computer engineering are the ones who can capture the situation the most quickly.
Keywords: Human Factors in Security · Homograph Domain · International Domain Name
(IDN) · Linear Regression Model · Student t-test Statistics
1 Introduction
Homograph attack is first described by E. Gabrilovic et al. [1] in 2002. To demonstrate the
feasibility of the attack, the authors registered a homograph targeting to the brand domain
microsoft.com using the Russian letters ’c’ (U+0421) and ’o’ (U+041E). The homograph con-
tains the two non-ASCII characters and has an ASCII converted form as xn--mirsft-yqfbx.com.3
However, the attack was not much attracted at that time. Until 2017, the attack had raised broad
attention when the famous brand domain apple.com (Apple Inc.) is attacked by the homograph
that appears under the Punycode form [2] such as xn--pple-43d.com, which uses the Cyrillic
‘a’ (U+0430) instead of the ASCII ‘a’ (U+0061). Thereafter, many homograph attacks targeting
other famous brand domains have been found such as Adobe Inc. [3], LLoyds Bank [4], Google
Analytics [5], etc. A recent large-scale analysis [6] about International Domain Names (IDNs) in
2018 shows that, just for the first 1,000 brand domains in top Alexa ranking, more than 1,516
homograph domains were already registered. Furthermore, the attack becomes more progressive
and sophisticated today.
3 International Domain Names (IDNs) contain non-ASCII characters (e.g., Arabic, Chinese, Cyrillic
alphabet). Therefore, they are encoded to ASCII strings using Punycode transcription known as
IDNA encoding and appear under ASCII strings starting with “xn--”. For example, the domain
xn--ggle-0qaa.com is displayed as go˜o˜gle.com.
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Motivation Many defensive approaches have been proposed such as applying machine learning
to some features (e.g., visual similarity metrics, HTML content, and optical character recognition
(OCR)) [7–10], using empirical analysis based on registered databases (e.g., Whois, DNS, black-
lists, confusable Unicode) [6,11], or blocking International Domain Names (IDNs) (e.g., disabling
the automatic IDN conversion on browsers) [12–15]. So, we ask the question: how to design an ap-
proach that focuses on pro-active defense which can control the attack rather than just responding
to it after it has really happened; and is it possible if the approach is based on ergonomics rather
than machine engineering? We therefore in this paper, aim to propose a system that analyzes
human factors in the ability of homograph domain identification. This, in turn, allows for various
security training courses against the attack aiming to appropriate participants.
Contribution To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to devise a system that predicts
if human demographics, brand familiarity, and security backgrounds can influence the ability of
homograph recognition. To do so, we designed a survey and applied it to 2067 participants who
are Internet users in Japan. We subsequently build a regression model to study which factors
affect the ability. As a result, we find that for different levels of visual similarity, the participants
exhibit different abilities. 13.95% of participants can recognize non-homographs while 16.60% of
participants can recognize homographs whose visual similarity with the target brand domains is
under 99.9%; but when the similarity increases to 99.9%, the number of participants who can
recognize homographs significantly drops down to only 0.19%; and for the homographs with 100%
of visual similarity, there is no way for the participants to recognize. We also find that while female
participants tend to be able to recognize homographs, male participants tend to able to recognize
non-homographs. The result also shows that security knowledge is a significant factor affecting
both homographs and non-homographs. We hypothesized that people who have strong security
knowledge can recognize both homograph and non-homograph; but surprisingly, it is only true
for the case of homographs but not for the case of non-homographs. Another interesting result
is that people who work or are educated in computer science or computer engineering do not
appear as a factor affecting the ability of homograph recognition. However, right after they are
explained about what the homograph attack is, people who work or are educated in computer
science or computer engineering are the ones who can capture the situation the most quickly (i.e,
from not an affecting factor to become an affecting factor the most quickly). We believe that it
opens avenues to help users reduce their presumptuousness and improve knowledge and carefulness
about security threats.
Roadmap The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related work is described in Section 2.
The procedure for preparing the survey is presented in Section 3. The methodology is given in
Section 4. The experiment is analyzed in Section 5. The discussion is mentioned in Section 6.
Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section 7.
2 Related Work
In this section, we introduce related work about defending homograph approaches and related work
about factor analysis of the brand familiarity, and security background in computer security-related
issues.
2.1 Disabling the Automatic IDN Conversion
In this approach, the feature of automatic IDN conversion is disabled in the web browser. In-
stead of showing the converted form of the domain such as go˜o˜gle.com, the browsers only display
the original IDN form such as xn--ggle-0qaa.com in the address bar. In reality, some popular
web browsers applied this approach including Chrome and Firefox [12], Safari [13], Internet Ex-
plorer [14], and Opera [15]. However, there is a big trade-off when the browsers stop supporting
the automatic IDN conversion because a large number of Internet users are using non-English lan-
guages with non-Latin alphabets through over 7.5 million registered IDNs in all over the world (by
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December 2017) [16]. Furthermore, the homograph attack exploits not only look-alike Punycode
characters in IDNs, but also look-alike Latin characters in non-IDNs. For instance, the homograph
bl0gsp0t.com targeted to the brand domain blogspot.com by replacing the o by the 0; or the
homograph wlklpedia.org targeted to the brand domain wikipedia.com by replacing the i by
the l. Also, if the homographs can deceive users before appearing in the address bar of browsers
(e.g., the homographs are given from an email or a document under hyper-links) without the users’
awareness of the browsers, disabling IDN conversion is not meant to prevent users from accessing
the homographs.
2.2 Detecting Homographs
Several methods have been proposed to detect homographs. K. Tian et al. [7] scanned five types of
squatting domains over DNS records and identified domains that are likely impersonating popular
brands. They then build a machine learning classifier to detect homographs using page behaviors,
visual analysis and optical character recognition (OCR). L. Baojun et al. [6] made a large-scale
analysis on IDNs using correlating data from auxiliary sources such as Whois, passive DNS and
URL blacklist. They found that 1.4 million IDNs were actively registered in which 6000 IDNs
were determined as homographs by URL blacklists. They also identified 1,516 IDNs showing high
visual similarity to reputable brand domains. S. Yuta et al. [8] applies machine learning on optical
character recognition (OCR) feature of a huge 1.92 million actual registered IDNs and over 10,000
malicious IDNs. A. Pieter et al. [9] collected data about the typosquatting homographs of the 500
most popular websites for seven months. They reveal that 95% of the popular domains they inves-
tigated are actively targeted by typosquatters, only few brand owners protect themselves against
this practice by proactively registering their own typosquatting domains. The study also reveals
that a large of typosquatting homographs can be traced back to a small group of typosquatting
page hosters and that certain top-level domains are much more prone to typosquatting than others.
T. Thao et al. [10] constructed a classification model for homographs and potential homographs
registered by attackers using machine learning on feasible and novel features which are the visual
similarity on each character and selected information from Whois. Several tools [17–23] gener-
ate permutations of homographs from a defined subset of look-alike characters from Confusable
Unicode table defined by Unicode Inc. [11], then look up Whois and DNS to check whether the
homographs are registered and active. Compared to the approach of disabling the automatic IDN
conversion, the homograph detection is more attractive to the research community.
2.3 Brand Familiarity and Security Backgrounds in Computer Security
In this section, we present work related to web familiarity and security backgrounds including
security warnings, security knowledge, security behavior, and security self-confidence that affect
human decisions on security threats. Since some previous papers analyzed both brand familiarity
and security backgrounds, we do not separate them into two different sections.
T. Kelley et al. [24] simulate several secure non-spoof and insecure spoof domains with different
authentication levels such as extended validation, standard validation, or partial encryption. A
logistic model is then applied to participants’ respondents to compare how encryption level, web fa-
miliarity, security knowledge, and mouse tracking influence the participant accuracy in identifying
spoof and non-spoof websites. Their result shows that user behavior derived from mouse tracking
recordings leads to higher accuracy in identifying spoof and non-spoof websites than the other
factors. Y. Sawaya et al. [25] apply the Security Behavior Intentions Scale (SeBIS) [26] to partici-
pants from seven countries and build a regression model to study which factors affect participants’
security behavior using a cross-cultural survey. The work concluded that self-confidence in com-
puter security has a larger positive effect on security behavior compared to actual knowledge about
computer security. I. Kirlappos et al. [27] show that users do not focus on security warnings (or not
understand what they are) rather than looking for signs to confirm whether a site is trustworthy.
The study reveals that advice given in some current user educations about phishing is largely ig-
nored. It, therefore, suggests that rather than flooding users with information, we need to consider
how users make decisions both in business and personal settings for the user education. M. Sharif
et al. [28] design a survey of security warnings, user behavior, knowledge and self-confidence about
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security to evaluate the utility of self-reported questionnaire for predicting exposure to malicious
content. Their result confirms that the self-reported data can help forecast exposure risk over long
periods of time but is not as crucial as behavioral measurements to accurately predict exposure.
S. Das et al. [29] find that social processes played a major role in security behavior. Furthermore,
conversations about security are often driven by the desire to warn or protect others from im-
mediate novel threats observed or experienced. C. Erika et al. [30] study user confidence toward
security and privacy for smartphone and find that participants are apprehensive about running
privacy- and financially-sensitive tasks on their phones as four factors: fear of theft and data loss,
misconceptions about the security of their network communications, worries about accidentally
touching or clicking, and mistrust of smartphone applications. I. Iulia et al. [31] compare security
behaviors between expert and non-expert and find that while experts frequently report installing
software updates, using two-factor authentication and using a password manager, non-experts re-
port using antivirus software, visiting only known websites, and changing passwords frequently. A.
Felt et al. [32] examine whether security warnings from the Android permission system is effective
to users. Their result shows that only 17% of participants paid attention to permissions during
installation, and only 3% of Internet survey respondents could correctly answer all permission
comprehension questions. This indicates that current Android security warnings do not help most
users make correct security decisions.
3 Procedure
In this section, we present how the survey is designed and distributed to the participants. The
survey is created in the Japanese and is embedded to a webpage. The webpage is then distributed
to 2,067 participants who are Internet users in Japan.4 The participants cannot submit their
responses if any of the questions is not answered. There are three question parts about the human
factors (including demographics, brand familiarity, and security backgrounds), and the final part
about the participants’ ability in distinguishing homographs. The following sections describe the
design of each part.
3.1 Demographics
For the human demographics, the survey consists of the following seven questions:
1. Gender (male: 1 and female: 0)
2. Age (the inputs are integers)
3. Having a job (having a full-time job: 1, freelancer or part-time job: 0.5, and not have a job:
0).
4. Whether the participant has studied so far the languages including English, Spanish, French,
Russian, Portuguese, German, Vietnamese, Turkish, Italian, Greek, and Dutch. The languages
chosen are the common languages that use Punycode (i.e., confusable letters with the English
alphabet). For each language, there are two answer options (yes:1 and no: 0). Thereafter, we
calculate the number of languages that the participants answer ‘yes’.
5. Knowing only Japanese (yes: 1, and no: 0). Although there is a variable related to the number
of languages that the participants have studied so far, we hypothezied that knowing only
Japanese or not is probably an affecting factor because the survey is done in Japan. Thereby
knowing only Japanese is chosen as a variable that needs to be measured.
6. Whether the participant graduated or enrolled in computer science or computer engineering
(yes: 1 and no: 0).
7. Whether the participant worked (or is working) in computer science or computer engineering
(yes: 1 and no: 0).
4 The Appendix in this paper describes the questions in English but the survey is designed in Japanese
language and distributed to Japanese, so there is no translation problem for the preservation of the
survey’s reliability and structure validity.
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3.2 Brand Familiarity
For the brand familiarity, the nine famous brands are chosen including Amazon, Google, Coinbase,
Wiki, Booking, Expedia, Paypal, Sex.com and Facebook. For each of the brands, the participants
respond to how they are familiar with the brands with 4-point Likert-scale answer options (do
not know: 1, know but never use: 2, occasionally use: 3, and often use: 4). The brands may have
multiple authentic domains (i.e., the domains that the brands themselves registered), and thus the
logos and the names of the brands are used to represent the brands and showed in the questions
instead of listing all their domains.
3.3 Security Backgrounds
For the security backgrounds, the survey consists of the following five questions:
1. Anti-virus software installation on PCs or mobile devices: (yes: 1 and no: 0).
2. Security warning: When browsing a website, a browser or anti-virus software issues a warning,
whether the participants continue browsing or not (yes: 1 and no: 0).
3. Security behavior: that consists of sixteen sub-questions as described in Appendix A. For each
of the sub-questions, the participants choose 5-point Likert-scale answer options (not at all:
1, rarely: 2, sometimes: 3, often: 4, and always: 5). The summation of all the sixteen answers
is then calculated and used as the variable in the model instead of each separated answer.
4. Security knowledge: that consists of eighteen sub-questions as described in Appendix B. For
each of the sub-questions, the participants have two answer options (true: 1 and false: 0).
Then, based on the actual correct answers given at the end of the appendix, we count the
number of correct answers of the participants.
5. Security self-confidence: that consists of six sub-questions as described in Appendix C. The
participants have 5-point Likert-scale answer options (not at all: 1, not applicable: 2, neither
agree nor disagree: 3, applicable: 4, and very applicable: 5). Similar to the security behavior,
the summation of the six answers is calculated and used for the model.
For the security behaviors, security knowledge, and security self-confidence, we use the design
from the paper [25]. The paper aims to analyze factors that affect security behavior and thus uses
security behavior in the target function. Meanwhile, our work aims to analyze factors (including
security behavior) that affect the ability of homograph recognition, and thus security behavior is
just one of the features, not used in the target function.
No Domains Target Brand
#1 Amazon
#2 Amazon
#3 Amazon
#4 Google
#5 Google
#6 Google
#7 Coinbase
#8 Wiki
#9 Wiki
No Domains Target Brand
#10 Booking
#11 Booking
#12 Expedia
#13 Expedia
#14 Paypal
#15 Paypal
#16 Sex.com
#17 Facebook
#18 Facebook
Fig. 1: Sample Domains Used for Testing the Ability in Distinguishing Homographs
3.4 Homograph Recognition
This part is used for calculating the values of the target function. The eighteen sample domains
mixed between homographs and non-homographs are showed in Figure 1 and explained in Ap-
pendix D. The domains target to the nine brands mentioned in the brand familiarity. The domains
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are chosen for different purposes. For example, the domain #2 (amazonaws.com) is chosen because
participants probably only know amazon.com and think amazonaws.com is a homograph but ac-
tually it is not. Another example is the domain #16 (sex.com) which is a pornographic domain,
and thus the participants probably think it is homograph (unsafe) but actually it is not. For each
of the eighteen domains, the participants answer whether it is safe or not. Based on the correct
answers described in the Appendix D, we extract whether the participants have a correct answer
for each domain (true: 1, and false: 0). The reason we choose the number of domains as 18 but
not 30, 40 or even more is that the participants will tend to randomly choose the answer options
instead of actually answering if a survey contains too many questions, and 18 questions are a good
limit for our design.
4 Methodology
This section describes the pre-process on the raw data of the participants’ responses, determine
the target function and define the model.
4.1 Domain Grouping
The eighteen sample domains are grouped based on the visual similarity with the brand domains.
In this paper, the Structural Similarity Index (SSIM) [33] is chosen for the visual similarity metric.
SSIM is commonly used since it outperforms the traditional methods such as Peak Signal-To-Noise
Ratio (PSNR) and Mean Squared Error (MSE) which can estimate only the absolute errors. Firstly,
the domains are parsed to images in the same size N ×N . The SSIM between two images x and
y is then calculated as follows:
SSIM(x, y) =
(2µxµy + c1)(2σxy + c2)
(µ2x + µ
2
y + c1)(σ
2
x + σ
2
y + c2)
(1)
The µx and µy represent the averages of x and y, respectively. The σ
2
x and σ
2
y represent the
variances of x and y, respectively. c1 = (k1L)
2 and c2 = (k2L)
2 represent the variables to stabilize
the division with weak denominator where L is the dynamic range of the pixel-values and is
typically set to L = 2#bits per pixel − 1 and k1 = 0.01, k2 = 0.03 by default. SSIM values [−1, 1]
where 1 indicates perfect similarity.
Table 1: The SSIM of Eighteen Sample Domains
Group No Group Name Domain# Brand Domain SSIM
Group 1
Homographs with
SSIM ≥ 0.999
#3 amazon.com 1.000
#4 google.com 1.000
#10 booking.com 0.999
#15 paypal.com 1.000
Group 2
Homographs with
SSIM < 0.999
#1 amazon.com 0.994
#6 google.com 0.838
#7 coinbase.com 0.996
#9 wikipedia.org 0.994
#12 expedia.com 0.995
#14 paypal.com 0.993
#17 facebook.com 0.845
Group 3 Non-homographs
#2 amazon.com 0.865
#5 google.com 0.950
#8 wikipedia.org 0.853
#11 booking.com 0.780
#13 expedia.com 0.950
#16 sex.com 1.000
#18 facebook.com 0.667
Using the SSIM, the eighteen sample domains are categorized into three groups:
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– Group 1: Homographs with SSIM ≥ 0.999. This group consists of four homographs including
the domains #3, #4, #10 and #15 in Figure 1. The domains #3, #4 and #15 have SSIM
= 1 which means they look completely the same as the brand domains. The domain #10 has
SSIM = 0.999 because the look-alike letter ‘g’ is very difficult to be recognized.
– Group 2: Homographs with SSIM < 0.999. This group consists of seven homographs including
domains #1, #6, #7, #9, #12, #14, and #17 in Figure 1. This group considers the homo-
graphs whose SSIM scores are lower than those in Group 1, but not so low, i.e., ranging from
0.838 to 0.996. Other homographs with lower SSIM are not considered since it may be trivial
to be recognized by the participants.
– Group 3: Non-homographs. This group consists of seven non-homographs including the do-
mains #2, #5, #8, #11, #13, #16, and #18 in Figure 1. The domains #2, #5, #8, #11,
#13, and #18 are safe domains that are registered by the brand themselves for different
services but have less popularity than the main brand domains. For instance, the domain
#2 amazonaws.com (Amazon Web Services (AWS)) is a cloud computing service of Amazon.
Many people may be confused with the main service of Amazon which is the selling service
amazon.com. The domain #16 sex.com is chosen since we want to know how participants
balance their decisions between a domain that is famous and actually safe with a domain that
is notorious for its content category (e.g., pornographic, darknet, terrorism).
For each group, the domain numbers, the brand domains, and the corresponding SSIMs are sum-
marized in Table 1.
4.2 Lucky Answers and Neutral Answers
The survey is designed so that for each of the eighteen sample domains, the participants not only
answer whether the domain is a homograph but also describe the reasons for their decision. A
lucky answer is an answer that has a correct decision but inappropriate reason. A neutral answer
is an answer that has a correct decision but unclear reason. For instance, a participant who decides
goole.co.jp as a homograph and answers a correct reason such as “the letter g is missing” is not
considered as a lucky answer. A participant who decides goole.co.jp as a homograph and answers
an incorrect reason such as ‘Google only has .co.jp as a top-level domain, and thus google.com is
unsafe” is considered as a lucky answer. A participant who decides goole.co.jp as a homograph
and answers an unclear reason such as “I have a feeling that” is considered as a neutral answer.
Table 2: Lucky Answers and Neutral Answers
Group Domain # Incorrect Answer
Correct Answer
Appropriate Reason Lucky and Neutral Answers
Group 1
#3 1411 (68.26 %) 0 ( 0 %) 656 (31.74 %)
#4 1432 (69.28 %) 0 ( 0 %) 635 (30.72 %)
#10 755 (36.53 %) 4 ( 0.19 %) 1308 (63.28 %)
#15 756 (36.57 %) 0 ( 0 %) 1311 (63.43 %)
Group 2
#1 495 (23.95 %) 470 (22.74 %) 1102 (53.31 %)
#6 649 (31.40 %) 167 ( 8.08 %) 1251 (60.52 %)
#7 173 ( 08.37 %) 302 (14.61 %) 1592 (77.01 %)
#9 354 (17.13 %) 296 (14.32 %) 1417 (68.55 %)
#12 243 (11.76 %) 341 (16.50 %) 1483 (71.75 %)
#14 171 ( 08.27 %) 354 (17.13 %) 1542 (74.60 %)
#17 229 (11.08 %) 471 (22.79 %) 1367 (66.13 %)
Group 3
#2 1796 (86.89 %) 271 (13.11 %)
#5 1823 (88.20 %) 244 (11.80 %)
#8 1827 (88.39 %) 240 (11.61 %)
#11 1832 (88.63 %) 235 (11.37 %)
#13 1397 (67.59 %) 670 (32.41 %)
#16 1841 (89.07 %) 226 (10.93 %)
#18 1935 (93.61 %) 132 ( 6.39 %)
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The lucky answers are excluded from the dataset since they are completely data outliers. For
the neutral answers, we cannot just flip the decision from true to false because there is a well-known
finding from researchers showing that very often, human experts cannot explain why they make
a choice that they do, but they are correct far more often than non-experts. Ericsson et al. [34]
first found this studying chess experts, and the finding has been replicated and found many times
since then by people such as Gerd Gigerenzer et al. [35] and Gary Klein [36]. This means that
it is difficult to classify the neutral answers into data bias or actual correct answers. Therefore,
in this paper, we decide to just exclude them from the dataset. It is safe rather than adjusting
the participant responses like flipping from true to false. We manually check each of 2, 067 × 18
answers from the 2,067 participants for the eighteen sample domains to find the lucky answers
and neutral answers and summarize in Table 2. In this table, the incorrect answers (column 3)
and the correct answers with appropriate reasons (column 4) are used for the model. For group 3
(non-homograph), we do not need to remove lucky and neutral answers because: if the participants
answer correctly (i.e., the domains are non-homograph), there is nothing to do; but if they answer
incorrectly (the domains are homograph), with any reason, the participant’s decisions are wrong.
4.3 Model
Let f denote the model for measuring the participants’ ability in distinguishing homographs. f is
defined as follows:
f ∼ Demographics + WebFamiliarity + SecBackgrounds (2)
The explanatory variables related to Demographics consist of gender, age, having a job, whether
the participants know only Japanese, the number of specific languages that the participant has
studied so far, whether the participant is educated in computer science/ computer engineering,
whether the participant works in computer science or computer engineering. The explanatory
variable related to WebFamiliarity is the usage frequency of the brands. The explanatory variables
related to SecBackgrounds are anti-virus installation, security warnings, security behaviors, security
knowledge, and security self-confidence.
Target Functions The incorrect answers and the correct answers with appropriate reasons are
extracted for the model. For each group, two experiment plans are performed using two different
target functions.
– Integration: This plan integrates all the domains in the group using the target function:
f1 =
∑
di
SSIM(di, bi)× difficult(di) ∗ decision(di) (3)
where decision(di) denotes the decision of the participants in distinguishing whether the domain
di is a homograph. SSIM(di, bi) denotes the SSIM between the domain di and its corresponding
brand domain bi. difficulty(di) denotes the difficulty of the domain di and is defined as (1− cit )
in which ci is the number of participants who give correct decisions for di and t = 2, 067 is the
total number of participants. For example, there are 10 participants in which 7 participants
answer correctly and thus the difficulty of the question is 1 − 710 . In this plan, the multiple
(linear) regression model is applied one time for all the domains, and then the affecting factors
for the integration target functions are extracted.
– Separation: This plan applies the multiple (linear) regression model for each domain in the
group and finds the affecting factors for each domain. The common affecting factors are then
extracted. The target function is defined as follows:
f2 = decision(di) (4)
Since each domain is considered separately, SSIM(di, bi) and difficult(di) are not necessary for
the target function. After the factors affecting the target function are determined, the common
factors for all the domains are extracted.
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The SSIM and the difficulty are not used as variables in the features but used as elements in
the target functions because the SSIM and the difficulty are not related to human information but
domain information, and the goal in this paper is analyzing the human factors. Furthermore, for
each domain, the SSIM and the difficulty are the same for all 2,067 participants. If the SSIM and
the difficulty are used as the variables, the regression model always results that the SSIM and the
difficulty are the affecting factors with p ≤ 0.05. It is therefore not meant in finding factors.
Factor Determination Before showing how the factors affecting the target functions are deter-
mined, we briefly describe the preliminary of the (student) t-test. A t-test [37, 38] is commonly
used to determine whether the mean of a population significantly differs from a specific value
(called the hypothesized mean) or from the mean of another population. In other words, the t-test
can tell if the differences could happen by chance. For the first step, the t-test takes the sample
from each set and establishes the problem statement by assuming a null hypothesis that the two
means are equal. Then, it calculates certain values and compares them with the standard values to
determine if the assumed null hypothesis is accepted or rejected. If the null hypothesis is rejected,
it indicates that data readings are strong and are not by chance. In the t-test, the t-value repre-
sents a ratio between the difference between the two groups and the difference within the groups.
The larger the t-value, the more difference there is between groups (the more likely it is that the
results are repeatable). The smaller the t-value, the more similarity there is between groups. If the
t-value is negative, it shows a reversal in the directionality of the effect being studied. However,
it has no impact on the significance of the difference between groups of data. Every t-value has a
corresponding p-value. A p-value is the probability that the results from the sample data occurred
by chance. The p-values vary from 0 to 1. The low p-value is good (it indicates the data did not
occur by chance). In most cases, a p-value that is ≤ 0.05 is accepted to mean the data is valid. In
this paper, the affecting factors have the following p-values:
– p ≤ 0.001: significant factors that strongly affect the target function, marked as (***) in the
experiment result.
– 0.001 < p ≤ 0.01: semi-significant, marked as (**) in the experiment result.
– 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05: normal factor affecting the target function, marked as (*) in the experiment
result.
In the experiment result, we also show 95% confidence interval (CI) which is a range of likely of
the unknown population parameter. For the first plan (integration), the common samples which
contain only incorrect answers and correct answers with appropriate reasons are inputted in the
regression model. The factors are then determined based on the t-test’s result. For the second plan
(separation), the factors affecting the target function in each domain are determined. The common
factors are then extracted. The final factors chosen for this plan is the common factors that affect
≥ dN2 e domains where N denotes the number of domains in the group, and dN2 e denotes the upper
bound of N2 .
4.4 Consistency of Integration and Separation Plans
The best case is when both the plans result in the same set of affecting factors. If the case does not
happen, we determine the final affecting factor as follows. Let I and S denote the set of affecting
factors found in the integration and separation plan, respectively. Let R denote the set of the
affecting factors that we are aiming to find.
– All the common affecting factors of both the plans I ∩ S are included in R.
– If there exists a factor x ∈ I such that x /∈ S, x is included in R if x is an significant factor in
the integration plan (p ≤ 0.001).
– If there exists a factor x ∈ S such that x /∈ I, x is included in R if the significant p-values
(p ≤ 0.001) are dominant in S (i.e., the significant p-values belong to more than |S|2 domains
where | S | denotes the number of factors in S).
The consistency of both the plans is the final result used for the conclusion; however, the factors
found in each plan still gives a lot of important information and we cannot omit their details.
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5 Experiment
The program is written in Python 3.7.4 on a computer MacBook Pro 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7, RAM
16 GB. The multiple (linear) regression model is executed using scikit-learn package version 0.21.
The t-test is computed using statsmodels package version 0.10. The SSIM is computed using the
skimage package version 0.15.dev0.
5.1 Participant Population
Before performing the model, we check if the participant sampling process is valid. First, we
analyze whether the participant demographics of gender and age statistically match those of an
actual data (e.g., data from government census). Second, we show that the distribution of the age
(continuous values) is a normal distribution (Gaussian distribution) (for the gender, the data is
binary not continuous values and thus, there is no need for normal distribution test).
Table 3: Participant Sampling
Age Range Male Female
under 20 52 86
20-29 244 210
30-39 148 148
40-49 148 148
50-59 148 148
60-69 171 236
over 70 123 57
(a) Age Ranges and Gender
Gender
Male 1034 (50.02 %)
Female 1033 (49.98 %)
Actual Male % 50 % [39]
Age
Average 44.81
Median 45
Min 15
Max 70
Actual Median 35 to 44 [39]
(b) Matching Actual Statistics
As mentioned in Section 3, the 2067 participants are chosen from Internet users in Japan. We
match them with a report of the population census from Japanese Internet users [39]. Table 3
describes the age and gender of our samples. Table 3a describes the distribution of gender with
different age ranges. Table 3b shows the actual percentage of men within the population of Internet
users, and the range in which the actual median age of Internet users lies. The normal distribution
test is given in Figure 2. The bell curve and the skewness (0.005) that is very close to 0 show that
the data is valid for a normal distribution.
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Distribution of Age
Metric Value
Mean 44.812
Standard Error 0.375
Median 45.000
Standard Deviation 17.072
Sample Variance 291.439
Kurtosis -1.361
Skewness 0.005
Range 55.000
Confidence Level (95.0 %) 0.736
Count 2067.000
Fig. 2: Distribution Curve and Distribution Summary of The Age
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5.2 Cronbach’s Alpha (α) Measurement
We use the Cronbach’s α [40, 41] to measure the internal consistency (IC) or the reliability of
the questions that have multiple Likert-scale sub-questions. Suppose that we measure a quantity
which is a sum of K components: X = Y1 +Y2 + · · ·+YK . The Cronbach’s α is defined as follows:
α =
K
K − 1(1−
∑K
i=1 σ
2
Yi
σ2X
), (5)
where σ2X denotes the variance of the observed total test scores, and σ
2
Yi
denotes the variance of
the component i for the current sample of persons. We then use the rule of thumb for interpreting
α as follows:
– α ≥ 0.9: Excellent IC
– 0.9 > α ≥ 0.8: Good IC
– 0.8 > α ≥ 0.7: Acceptable IC
– 0.7 > α ≥ 0.6: Questionable IC
– 0.6 > α ≥ 0.5: Poor IC
– 0.5 > α: Unacceptable IC
In our survey, five questions consist of multiple sub-questions. Three of them include brand fa-
miliarity (4-point Likert-scale), security behavior (5-point Likert-scale), and security self-confidence
(5-point Likert-scale). For the security knowledge (that contains eighteen binary sub-questions)
and the user decision on distinguishing eighteen domains (that contains also eighteen binary sub-
questions), we consider them as 2-point Liker-Scale questions. The result of Cronbach’s α is showed
in Table 4. The internal consistency of all the questions is better than or equal to acceptable. This
indicates that our survey is reliable.
Table 4: Cronbach’s α Results for Likert-scale Questions
Question
No. of Sub- Sum of Item Vari- Variance of Total Cronbach’s
IC
questions (K) ances (
∑K
i=1 σ
2
Yi
) Scores (σ2X) α
Brand Familiarity 9 4.446 12.167 0.713 Acceptable
Security Behavior 16 27.203 163.219 0.889 Good
Security Confidence 6 5.699 25.920 0.936 Excellent
Security Knowledge 18 3.038 10.109 0.741 Acceptable
Homograph Decision 18 2.585 16.095 0.889 Good
5.3 Result for Group 1
When distributing the survey to the participants, we hypothezied that nobody can distinguish the
homographs because the visual similarity is almost 100 %. However, the actual data surprisingly
contains a large number of correct answers (over 30 % for domain #3 and #4, and even over
60 % for domain #10 and #15). Fortunately, the analysis of lucky and neutral answers given in
Table 2 indicates that there is no correct answer with appropriate reasons in the case of domains
#3, #4 and #15 which have 100 % of SSIM, and only 0.19 % of correct answers with appropriate
reasons in the case of domains #10 which has 99.9 % of SSIM. We now can confirm that there is
no way for the participants to distinguish such extremely high-SSIM homographs. This raises the
seriousness of homograph attacks. For this group, we only did the statistics without the need to
apply the regression model.
5.4 Result for Group 2
In the first experiment plan (integration), each domain in this group has a different set of incorrect
answers and correct answers with appropriate reasons. Finally, 146 common samples (out of 2067
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samples) are filtered. The regression model with the target function f1 given in Equation 3 is
applied and the result is showed in Table 5. Remind that, (*) represents 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, (**)
represents 0.001 < p ≤ 0.01, and (***) represents p ≤ 0.001. There are four affecting factors found
including:
– Have a job: normal factor, the positive coefficient (0.1425) indicates that people who have a
job tend to have the ability of homograph recognition.
– Know only Japanese: semi-significant factor, the negative coefficient (−0.2636) indicates that
people who do not only know the Japanese have the ability of homograph recognition.
– Frequently use the brands: semi-significant factor, the positive coefficient (0.0322) indicates
that people who are more familiar with the brands have the ability of homograph recognition.
– Have better security knowledge: significant factor, the positive coefficient (0.0624) indicates
that people who have better security knowledge have the ability of homograph recognition.
For the second experiment plan (separation), the regression model with the target function f2
given in Equation 4 is applied on seven different sets of the incorrect answers and correct answers
for appropriate reasons of the seven domains in this group. The factors affecting f2 are found for
each domain. The common factors are then extracted. The number of samples in each domain
is respectively 965 (#1), 816 (#6), 475 (#7), 650 (#9), 584 (#12), 525 (#14), and 700 (#18).
The result is shown in the last seven columns of Table 5. In this table, only the p-values of the
affecting factors are described so that the common factors can be easily observed. (+) represents
the positive coefficients. (−) represents the negative coefficients. The factors chosen for this plan
is the common factors that affect more than or equal to dN/2e = 4 domains including:
– Sex (male): affecting 6/7 domains, is a significant factor of 5 domains (#1, #9, #12, #14,
#17) and a normal factor of #7. All the coefficients are negative, this indicates that the
females tend to recognize homographs better than the males.
– Have a job: affecting 5/7 domains, is a significant factor of #9, #17 and a normal factor of
#7, #12 and #14. All the coefficients are positive; this indicates that the people who have a
job tend to be able to recognize the homographs.
– Still browsing the website even if there is a warning from an anti-virus software: affecting 4/7
domains, is a semi-significant factor of #1 and a normal factor of #12, #14, and #17. All
the coefficients are negative; this indicates that people who do not browse the website when
there is a warning tend to be able to distinguish the homographs.
– Have more security knowledge: affecting 7/7 domains, is a significant factor and has posi-
tive coefficients for all the domains. This indicates that the people who have better security
knowledge tend to be able to distinguish the homographs.
Consistency The results of the plans are not the same, so we perform the result consistency as
indicated in Section 4.4. The final set we are aiming to find (filled with gray color in Table 5)
consists of the following affecting factors:
– Sex (female) since all the coefficients are negative for males in the separation plan.
– People who have a job: this is the common factor of both the plans.
– More security knowledge: this is also the common factor of both the plans.
5.5 Result for Group 3
In this group, as explained in Section 4.2, the lucky and neutral answers are not necessary to
be excluded from the dataset. For the both experiment plans (integration and separation), the
regression model is applied on all 2067 samples using the target function f1 (Equation 3) in the
case of integration and f2 (Equation 4) in the case of separation. The results are showed in Table 6.
For the first experiment plan (integration), there are seven affecting factors found including:
– Sex (male): normal factor, the positive coefficient (0.1354) indicates that the males tend to be
able to distinguish the non-homographs.
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Table 5: Experiment Result of Group 2 (Homograph with SSIM < 0.999)
No. Factors
Integration Separation
Coef. p 95%CI #1 #6 #7 #9 #12 #14 #17
Number of Samples 146 965 816 475 650 584 525 700
(Intercept) -0.6607 0.007 [-1.134, -0.187]
1 Sex (male) -0.0705 0.261 [-0.194, 0.053] <0.001 0.032 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001
(−)*** (−)* (−)*** (−)*** (−)*** (−)***
2 Age (older) -0.0022 0.251 [-0.006, 0.002] <0.001 0.001 <0.001
(−)*** (−)*** (−)***
3 Have a job 0.1425 0.036 [ 0.009, 0.276] 0.016 <0.001 0.015 0.043 <0.001
* (+)* (+)*** (+)* (+)* (+)***
4 Know only Japanese -0.2636 0.006 [-0.451, -0.077] 0.015 <0.001 0.007
** (−)* (−)*** (−)**
5 Number of languages 0.0262 0.519 [-0.054, 0.106]
6 Install anti-virus -0.0920 0.189 [-0.230, 0.046]
7 Browse even warning -0.0295 0.648 [-0.157, 0.098] 0.010 0.018 0.042 0.044
(−)** (−)* (−)* (−)*
8 Frequently use brands 0.0322 0.004 [ 0.010, 0.054] 0.001 0.010
** (+)*** (−)**
9 Education in CS/CE -0.0316 0.820 [-0.306, 0.243]
10 Work in CS/CE -0.1940 0.093 [-0.421, 0.033]
11 More sec. behavior 0.0009 0.753 [-0.005, 0.007] 0.043
(+)*
12 More sec. knowledge 0.0624 <0.001 [ 0.041, 0.084] <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)***
13 More sec. confidence -0.0007 0.930 [-0.015, 0.014]
‘*’: 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ‘**’: 0.001 < p ≤ 0.01, ‘***’: p ≤ 0.001
(+): coefficient > 0, (−): coefficient < 0
– Age (older): semi-significant factor, the negative factor (−0.0052) indicates that the young
people tend to be able to distinguish the non-homographs.
– Have a job: significant factor, the negative factor (−0.2104) indicates that the people who do
not have a job tend to be able to distinguish the non-homographs.
– Browsing the website even if there is a warning from an anti-virus software: semi-significant
factor, the positive coefficient (0.1484 > 0) indicates that the people who still browse the
website even if there is a warning tend to be able to distinguish the non-homographs.
– Education in CS/CE: normal factor, the positive coefficient (0.3072) indicates that the people
who are educated in computer science or computer engineering tend to be able to distinguish
the non-homographs.
– Work in CS/CE: normal factor, the positive coefficient (0.2861) indicates that the people
who work in computer science or computer engineering tend to be able to distinguish the
non-homographs.
– Have better security knowledge: significant factor, the negative coefficient (−0.0551) indicates
that people who have less security knowledge have better ability in distinguishing the non-
homographs.
For the second experiment plan (separation), since this group also has seven domains as the
group 2, the factors chosen for this plan are the common factors that affect more than or equal
to 4 domains.
– Sex (male): affecting 4/7 domains, significant factor of #2, semi-significant factor of #8,
normal factor of #5 and #18. All the coefficients are positive; this indicates that the males
tend to be able to distinguish the non-homographs.
– Age (older): affecting 4/7 domains, significant factor of #11 and #13, semi-significant factor
of #8 and #16. All the coefficients are negative; this indicates that the young people tend to
be able to distinguish the non-homographs.
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– Have a job: affecting 6/7 domains, semi-significant factor of #8, #13, and #16, normal factor
of #2, #11, and #18. All the coefficients are negative; this indicates that the people who do
not have a job tend to be able to distinguish the non-homographs.
– Have better security knowledge: affecting 5/7 domains, is a significant factor and has negative
coefficients for all the domains. This indicates that the people who have less security knowledge
tend to be able to distinguish the non-homographs.
Table 6: Experiment Result of Group 3 (Non-homograph)
No. Factors
Integration Separation
Coef. p 95%CI #2 #5 #8 #11 #13 #16 #18
No. of Samples 2067
(Intercept) 1.3626 <0.001 [ 0.934, 1.791]
1 Sex (male) 0.1354 0.012 [ 0.029, 0.241] <0.001 0.019 0.004 0.011
* (+)*** (+)* (+)** (+)*
2 Age (older) -0.0052 0.002 [-0.008, -0.002] 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 0.003
** (−)** (−)*** (−)*** (−)**
3 Have a job -0.2104 <0.001 [-0.326, -0.095] 0.011 0.007 0.020 0.009 0.007 0.027
*** (−)* (−)** (−)* (−)** (−)** (−)*
4 Know only 0.0931 0.258 [-0.068, 0.254] 0.014
Japanese (+)*
5 Number of 0.0087 0.830 [-0.071, 0.088]
languages
6 Install -0.0796 0.211 [-0.204, 0.045] 0.043
anti-virus (−)*
7 Browse even 0.1484 0.009 [ 0.037, 0.259] 0.001 0.040
warning ** (+)*** (+)*
8 Frequently 0.0149 0.138 [-0.005, 0.035] <0.001
use brands (+)***
9 Education 0.3072 0.035 [ 0.021, 0.593] 0.016
in CS/CE * (+)*
10 Work 0.2861 0.018 [ 0.049, 0.523] 0.002 0.010
in CS/CE * (+)** (+)**
11 More sec. -0.0020 0.412 [-0.007, 0.003]
behavior
12 More sec. -0.0551 <0.001 [-0.075, -0.035] <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001
knowledge *** (−)*** (−)*** (−)*** (−)*** (−)***
13 More sec. 0.0060 0.322 [-0.006, 0.018] 0.049
confidence (+)*
‘*’: 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05, ‘**’: 0.001 < p ≤ 0.01, ‘***’: p ≤ 0.001
(+): coefficient > 0, (−): coefficient < 0
Consistency Similar to the group 2, the results of the plans in this group are also not the same,
so we perform the result consistency as indicated in Section 4.4. The final set we are aiming to
find (filled with the gray color in Table 6) consists of the following affecting factors. Fortunately,
all the factors are the common factors of both the plans.
– Sex (male): since all the coefficients are positive for both the plans.
– Young people: since all the coefficients are negative.
– People who do not have a job: since all the coefficients are negative.
– Less security knowledge: since all the coefficients are negative.
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6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss how the factors change when the participants are explained about the
homographs. We then discuss some several ideas for improving the result and their challenges for
future work.
6.1 Before and after Homograph Explanation/Education
The main result is described in Section 5. In this section, we perform an extra analysis of how
the factors change when the participants are explained about what the homograph attack is. In
the survey, after the participants give their decisions to the eighteen domains, a description of the
homograph is displayed (Appendix E). The participants then respond to their decision again to
the same eighteen domains. To avoid data outlier in the participants’ decisions (for ensuring the
independency in their decision before and after the homograph explanation), the web interface of
the survey is designed so that the participants cannot go back to previous questions before the
homograph explanation from the questions that are displayed after the homograph explanation.
In this analysis, we consider the integration plan for all the eighteen domains with all the 2067
participants5. Table 7 shows the experiment result. pBE and pAF denotes the p-values before and
after the homograph explanation, respectively. | 4p | denotes the change’s magnitude of p. The
fifth and sixth columns are the change of the coefficient signs and the significane, respectively.
N/A in the sixth column means that the factor is not an affecting factor (e.g., ** → N/A means
the variable is a semi-significant factor before the homograph explanation, but after that, it is
no longer an affecting factor). The result shows that there are five factors found in both cases of
before and after the homograph explanation. The three factors (anti-virus installation, frequently
use brands and more security knowledge) are consistent for both the cases. Sex (male) is no longer
an affecting factor after the homograph explanation. Interestingly, working in computer science
or computer engineering from not an affecting factor becomes an affecting factor. Furthermore,
| 4p |= 0.061 is highest compared to other affecting factors. This indicates that people who work
in computer science or computer engineering are able to capture the situation quickly after being
explained about the homographs.
Table 7: Factors Change before and after the Homograph Explanation
Factors pBE pAF | 4p | Coefficient Sign Significancy
Sex (male) 0.018 0.339 0.321 (+)→ (−) ** → N/A
Install anti-virus 0.001 0.045 0.044 (−)→ (−) *** → *
Frequently use brands <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 (−)→ (−) *** → ***
Work in CS/CE 0.083 0.022 0.061 (+)→ (+) N/A → *
More security knowledge <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 (−)→ (−) *** → ***
6.2 Future Work and Challenges
Related to the survey itself, there are three ideas that can improve the study. First, in this current
work, the survey is applied for local participants (i.e., Japanese). If it can be applied for global
participants, the responses would be more objective. In this case, there is a challenge in translating
the survey across the languages in different countries. The translation should be appropriately
considered while preserving its reliability and structure validity. Second, some features which may
affect the ability of homograph recognition including how many hours for using the Internet per
day, factors related to participant psychology like emotional state, demands and the environment
when answering the questionnaire, etc. Third, if the domains are asked to the participants in an
actual simulation rather than in a self-report questionnaire, the bias can be reduced and also other
5 Although there are lucky and neutral answers, they actually happened (these answers are the actual
samples in the dataset) and we would want to know how the factors are in this extra analysis.
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information related to participants can be extracted such as the time of accessing domains, the
scenario of accessing domains, and the mouse move.
Related to the model, some promising elements can be included in the target functions. The
first is the Alexa ranking. Some domains are very famous (e.g., amazon.com or google.com), and
thus the participants are more familiar with them rather than the domains that are less popular
(e.g., coinbase.com). The Alexa ranking can be considered in a global scope (if the survey is
applied to different countries) or in a local scope (if the survey is applied to a country like this
work). The second is the order of the domains in the questionnaire. In fact, the participants tend
to carefully answer the first few domains but gradually tend to answers the domains randomly;
and therefore there is bias in this case. The domain order in the questions should be added as a
component in the target function. Furthermore, there can be another bias when the participants
answer all domains as homographs because they perhaps think that it has a high probability for
the domains to be homographs in such a security survey, or think that false positive is better
than false negative when they are not sure. Designing a survey that can eliminate data bias is a
challenge in most of human factor research topics.
7 Conclusions
We designed and ran an online study to explore how user demographics, brand familiarity, and
security backgrounds affect the ability in recognizing homographs. We collected 2,067 responses
to our survey from participants located in Japan and analyzed them using linear regression. Our
results shed light on the differences in the ability of homograph recognition for different kinds of
homographs. We find that 13.95% of participants can recognize non-homographs while 16.60% of
participants can recognize homographs when the visual similarity with the target brand domains
is under 99.9%; but when the similarity increases to 99.9%, the number of participants who can
recognize homographs significantly drops down to only 0.19%; and for the homographs with 100%
of visual similarity, there is no way for the participants to recognize. We also find that for different
levels of visual similarity, the participants exhibit different abilities. Female participants tend to
recognize homographs while male participants tend to able to recognize non-homographs. Security
knowledge is a significant factor affecting both homographs and non-homographs. Surprisingly,
people who have strong security knowledge tend to be able to recognize homographs but not
non-homographs. Furthermore, an interesting result is that people who work or are educated in
computer science or computer engineering is not an affecting factor for the ability in recognizing
homograph as hypothesized; however, right after being explained about homograph attack, they
are the ones who can capture the situation the most quickly.
For the implication, first, we want to raise the seriousness of the homograph attack. Second,
we want to recommend looking into directions beyond user education to promote more ability in
homograph recognition, especially aiming at people who are male, who do not have a job, and who
have less security knowledge. Third, we want to emphasize that not all the domains that have high
visual similarity with the brand domains are the homographs. User education for non-homographs
is also necessary and can be aimed at people especially those who are female, elder, have a job
and have good security knowledge.
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A Appendix: Security Behavior
The question of security behavior consists of the following sixteen sub-questions:
1. I set my computer screen to automatically lock if I don’t use it for a prolonged period of time.
2. I use a password/passcode to unlock my laptop or tablet.
3. I manually lock my computer screen when I step away from it.
4. I use a PIN or passcode to unlock my mobile phone.
5. I change my passwords even if it is not needed.
6. I use different passwords for different accounts that I have.
7. When I create a new online account, I try to use a password that goes beyond the site’s
minimum.
8. I include special characters in my password even if it’s not required. requirements.
9. When someone sends me a link, I open it only after verifying where it goes.
10. I know what website I’m visiting by looking at the URL bar, rather than by the website’s look
and feel.
11. I verify that information will be sent securely (e.g., SSL, “https://”, a lock icon) before I
submit it to websites.
12. When browsing websites, I mouseover links to see where they go, before clicking them.
13. If I discover a security problem, I fix or report it rather than assuming somebody else will.
14. When I’m prompted about a software update, I install it right away.
15. I try to make sure that the programs I use are up-to-date.
16. I verify that my anti-virus software has been regularly updating itself.
Answer Options There are five answer options for each sub-question. The order numbers are
also the actual values used in the experiment.
1. Not at all
2. Not much
3. Sometimes
4. Often
5. Always
B Appendix: Security Knowledge
The question of security knowledge consists of the following eighteen sub-questions:
1. My Internet provider and location can be disclosed from my IP address.
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2. My telephone number can be disclosed from my IP addresses.
3. The web browser information of my device can be disclosed to the operators of websites.
4. Since Wi-Fi networks in coffee shops are secured by the coffee shop owners, I can use them to
send sensitive data such as credit card information.
5. Password comprised of random characters are harder for attackers to guess than passwords
comprised of common words and phrases.
6. If I receive an email that tells me to change my password, and links me to the web page, I
should change my password immediately.
7. My devices are safe from being infected while browsing the web because web browsers only
display information.
8. It is impossible to confirm whether secure communication is being used between my device
and a website.
9. My information can be stolen if a website that I visit masquerades as a famous website (e.g.,
amazon.com).
10. I may suffer from monetary loss if a website that I visit masquerades as a famous website.
11. My devices and accounts may be put at risk if I make a typing mistake while entering the
address of a website.
12. My IP address is secret and it is unsafe to share it with anyone.
13. If my web browser does not show a green lock when I visit a website, then I can deduce that
the website it is malicious.
14. It is safe to open links that appear in emails in my inbox.
15. It is safe to open attachments received via email.
16. I use private browsing mode to protect my machine from being infected.
17. It is safe to use anti-virus software downloaded through P2P file sharing services.
18. Machines are safe from infections unless participants actively download malware.
Answer Options There are two answer options for each sub-question. The order numbers are
also the actual values used in the experiment.
1. True (the value used in the experiment: 1)
2. False (the value used in the experiment: 0)
Correct Answers The correct answers for the eighteen sub-questions are: true for sub-questions
1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 11, and false for the others.
C Appendix: Security Self-Confidence
The question of security self-confidence consists of the following six sub-questions:
1. I know about countermeasures for keeping the data on my device from being exploited.
2. I know about countermeasures to protect myself from monetary loss when using the Internet.
3. I know about countermeasures to prevent my IDs or Passwords being stolen.
4. I know about countermeasures to prevent my devices from being compromised.
5. I know about countermeasures to protect me from being deceived by fake web sites.
6. I know about countermeasures to prevent my data from being stolen during web browsing.
Answer Options There are five answer options for each sub-question. The order numbers are
also the actual values used in the experiment.
1. Not at all
2. Not applicable
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Applicable
5. Very applicable
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D Appendix: Ability of Homograph Recognition
The question of homograph recognition consists of the following eighteen sub-questions:
1. Domain #1: xn--mazon-zjc.com (displayed as the sample 1 in Figure 1).
2. Domain #2: amazonaws.com.
3. Domain #3: xn--mazon-3ve.com (displayed as the sample 3 in Figure 1).
4. Domain #4: xn--gogle-m29a.com (displayed as the sample 4 in Figure 1).
5. Domain #5: google.com.vn.
6. Domain #6: goole.co.jp.
7. Domain #7: xn--coinbas-z8a.com (displayed as the sample 7 in Figure 1).
8. Domain #8: wikimedia.org.
9. Domain #9: xn--wikipdia-f1a.org (displayed as the sample 9 in Figure 1).
10. Domain #10: xn--bookin-n0c.com (displayed as the sample 10 in Figure 1).
11. Domain #11: jbooking.jp.
12. Domain #12: xn--expeda-fwa.com (displayed as the sample 12 in Figure 1).
13. Domain #13: expedia.co.jp.
14. Domain #14: xn--paypl-6qa.com (displayed as the sample 14 in Figure 1).
15. Domain #15: xn--pypal-4ve.com (displayed as the sample 15 in Figure 1).
16. Domain #16: sex.com.
17. Domain #17: faeceb0ok.com.
18. Domain #18: vi-vn.facebook.com.
Answer Questions There are two answer options for each sub-question. The order numbers are
also the actual values used in the experiment.
1. Homograph (the value used in the experiment: 1)
2. Non-homograph (the value used in the experiment: 0)
Correct Answers The eighteen domains are displayed respectively in Figure 1. The correct
answers for the eighteen domains are as follows:
– Homograph: the domains #1, #3, #4, #6, #7, #9, #10, #12, #14, #15, #17.
– Non-homographs: the others.
The homographs #1 and #3 target to the brand Amazon. The homographs #4 and #6 target to
the brand Google. The homograph #7 targets to the brand Coinbase; the homograph #9 targets
to the brand Wikipedia. The homograph #10 targets to the brand Booking. The homograph #12
targets to the brand Expedia. The homographs #14 and #15 target to the brand Paypal. The
homograph #17 targets to the brand Facebook.
E Appendix: Homograph Explanation
The description about the homograph attack is given as follows:
“Homograph attack is a way that the attackers deceive victims about what domain they are
communicating with by exploiting the fact that many domains look alike. There are several kinds
of homographs in the wild, we thus synthesize them into 5 categories. The first is visual homograph
which uses different characters but visually look alike, for example: facebook.com and facebok.com.
The second is semantic homograph which use synonyms or contextual similar words, for example:
facebook.com and markzuckerbergsocialnetwork.com. The third is TLD homograph which uses the
same main domain names, but different the top-level-domain (TLD), for example: facebook.com
and facebook.biz. The fourth is typosquatting which relies on mistakes such as typos made by
Internet users when typing the domain names, for example: facebook.com and faceboook.com.
The last is the combination of the previous 4 categories. Also, note that the homographs in which
certain characters are inserted or replaced (known as bitsquatting) in the brand domains are
listed in the fourth type (typosquatting homograph); for instance, travelgoogle.com targeting to
google.com”.
